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In 1956, Herbert Simon scolded researchers using
economic theory to characterize rational choice,
admonishing that “organisms … do not, in general,
‘optimize’ ” (p. 129). Simon rejected the notion that

decision makers met the god-like qualifications required
of rational agents. Instead, he proposed that, to fully
understand decision making, one must study two critical
components: the cognitive capacities of the organism and
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the structure of the environment in which an organism
operates (Simon 1956).
Despite the clear relevance of Simon’s ideas to the
study of animal behavior, few have appreciated his
contribution (but see Callebaut 2007). The role of the
environment has been appropriately credited as an
important force shaping animal behavior via the concept
of adaptive specialization. For instance, comparative
analysis indicates that a species’ foraging ecology likely
molds how it deals with risk and temporal delays in
decision making (Heilbronner et al. 2008; Rosati et al.
2007). The cognitive capacities of organisms, however,
have not been properly considered by models of animal
behavior, and this is where Fawcett et al.’s notion of the
behavioral gambit is useful.
Unlike many economists studying human behavior,
optimization modelers studying animal behavior
accepted early on that animals were not optimizing.
For instance, in the field of foraging theory, modelers
began searching for simple rules of thumb (such as
giving-up time rules) that animals could be using
to approach optimal outcomes (Stephens and Krebs
1986). But beyond developing simpler rules that avoid
the need for sophisticated computations, little work in
animal behavior has actively integrated psychological
mechanisms into evolutionary accounts of behavior.
Fawcett et al. nicely highlight the behavioral flexibility
that learning offers animals. Expressly modeling the
mechanisms of learning and how they influence behavior
is underappreciated and critical for understanding the
evolution of behavior. However, learning is not the only
means to achieve flexibility. Conditional decision rules
also produce behavioral flexibility, and they also require
an understanding of the cognitive building blocks that
must be in place for an organism to implement the rule.
The cognitive building blocks approach suggests
that decision rules are composed of multiple cognitive
capacities needed to process information. As an
example, consider the cooperative strategy tit-for-tat.
This relatively straightforward strategy simply copies
its opponent’s single last behavior in a cooperative
interaction. Though tit-for-tat and its variants have
been used extensively to model reciprocal cooperation
(e.g., Nowak 2006), rarely do researchers consider the
cognitive building blocks needed to implement it. Yet, titfor-tat requires that individual wait for future rewards,
remember past encounters, and perhaps quantify costs
and benefits and imitate partner actions (Stevens et
al. 2005). Unfortunately, animals (including humans)
have a difficult time waiting for future rewards and
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remembering specific past events, potentially limiting
the use of tit-for-tat and its variants. Experiments
on blue jays indicate that they only cooperate in an
iterated prisoner’s dilemma when they play against
a tit-for-tat strategist and the experimenter reduces
the jay’s impulsivity (Stephens et al. 2002). Further,
an experimental test of human memory in an iterated
prisoner’s dilemma situation demonstrates that even
humans have a difficult time tracking the past behavior
of partners (Stevens et al. 2011). Thus, psychological data
force us to rethink the kinds of strategies that organisms
actually use in cooperative situations.
The thrust of the behavioral gambit and cognitive
building blocks approaches is that we need to
fundamentally change how we model behavior.
Optimality and game theory have generated an
enormous amount of interesting research. But we cannot
stop there. To better understand how humans and
other animals behave, we must take Simon’s concept of
bounded rationality seriously and integrate cognitive
capacities with the structure of the environment when
constructing models of behavior. The behavioral gambit
has proven too risky.
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